Democratic institutions under stress

Democratic institutions under stress
“Declaro promulgado o documento da liberdade, da democracia e da justiça social do Brasil”, disse o então presidente da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Ulysses Guimarães, ao promulgar a nova Constituição Federal de 1988.

All of our very good intentions regarding a very tall reading stack of Brazil-related research were derailed by the pandemic. Among the many interesting pieces in that stack, however, a few recent articles on the stresses being faced by Brazilian democratic institutions drew the blog’s attention as we seek to return to semi-normalcy: 

Marcus André Melo reviews Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida’s book, Os Anos de Ouro (2019), calling it a “requiem” for a nascent democracy (or in Tavares de Almeida’s words, “a chronicle of a death foretold”). Melo’s review of Os Anos de Ouro provides a useful synopsis of the high-level tensions within Brazilian politics from the democratic transition to the Bolsonaro government. Perhaps most chillingly, the review highlights Tavares de Almeida’s caution that the citizens who made democracy possible cannot be guaranteed to be democratic citizens. Coming from one of the foremost political scientists in Brazil, who has been both an influential analyst and a prominent participant in Brazil’s democratic evolution, this is a startling reminder of the fragility of the current moment. 

Octavio Amorim Neto and Gabriel Alves Pimenta evaluate the first year of Bolsonaro’s first year in office, relying on Kurt Weyland’s definition of populism – the core of which “lies in the absence of institutional or party intermediation between the populist leader and the masses” – to compare Bolsonaro to his predecessors Jânio Quadros (elected in 1960) and Fernando Collor (elected in 1989). All three presidents share a similar right-wing, outsider’s populist sheen. The authors point out how all three were able to gain power by leveraging the disarray within the main political parties, a context of corruption and economic mismanagement, anti-establishment campaigns, and conflictual relations with Congress and the press. Tellingly, they conclude that Bolsonaro stands out for the scope of his proximity to the military and his hostility toward the courts and the left. 

An article by Joaquim Falcão and João Carlos Cochlar in Interesse Nacional does a great job of laying out the tensions generated by Brazil’s high court, the Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF), in the current political environment. As Falcão and Cochlar note, the Supreme Court has made important decisions that have preserved the rule of law against Bolsonaro’s incursions. Yet it has also been a constantly destabilizing force within the body politic, given the volatility of its decision making, especially in momentous cases. Alongside the congestion the court faces – which means that each of the 11 justices needs to decide three cases an hour for eight hours out of every working day to overcome any given year’s caseload – this collective indecision and inability to reach lasting collective agreements has been very damaging, especially as Lava Jato has cast doubts over the legitimacy of the political system. Falcão and Cochlar offer six commonsense solutions that the court could adopt to help it address the self-inflicted crisis, ranging from limits on the appeals process to a longer term for the chief justice. Depressingly, one wonders whether the court would be able to set aside its internal conflicts for long enough to adopt even these sensible correctives.

[As always, please send along your suggestions of good new Brazil-related social science research to aubrazilresearchinitiative@gmail.com]

Image: Ulysses Guimarães at the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution.
Credit: Arquivo Agência Brasil.